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JURISDICTION 
This matter was transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). This Court has Jurisdiction to decide 
appellants' appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Issue: Did the trial court err when it denied Osguthorpe's motion for 
summary judgment? 
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a 
matter of law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's 
legal conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, 
without according deference to the trial court." Brown v. l/l/e/s, 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah 
App. 1994) (citations omitted). 
2. Issue: Did the trial court err when it granted Smith's motion for partial 
summary judgment? 
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of 
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without 
according deference to the trial court." Id. 
3. Issue: Did the trial court err when it granted Smith's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on damages? 
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of 
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
1 
conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without 
according deference to the trial court." Id. 
4. Issue: Did the trial court err when it held, in its December 15, 1999 
Memorandum Decision that there was no genuine issue of material fact that title to the 
Disputed Property was in the Oral Partnership? 
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of 
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without 
according deference to the trial court." Id. 
5. Issue: Did the trial court err when it denied Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss for Failure to Join Indispensable Parties and failed to order necessary parties 
to be joined, having held in its January 16, 2001 Memorandum Decision, that The 
Canyons and Steve Osguthorpe have an interest with respect to the trial court's 
September 13, 2000 Memorandum Decision, and are therefore necessary parties, but 
failed to grant appellant's motion to dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties and, 
instead of ordering joinder, "asked" The Canyons and Steve Osguthorpe, neither of 
whom are parties to the action, "to file their opposition, if any, to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment within ten days" of the date of the order? 
Standard of Review: The determination of whether parties are indispensable 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a) is an issue of law. The substantive facts are not in dispute. 
It is the trial court's legal interpretation of Rule 19(a) which is at issue. This Court 
should review those legal conclusions for correctness. See Sacramento Baseball v. Gr. 
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N. Baseball, 748 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah 1987); Walker v. Brigham City, 856 P.2d 347, 
348 (Utah 1993); West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004 (Utah 1994). 
6. Issue: Did the trial court err in its May 25, 2001 Memorandum Decision 
when it reaffirmed its prior grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs? 
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of 
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without 
according deference to the trial court." Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah App. 
1994) (citations omitted). 
7. Issue: Did the trial court err when it granted summary judgment in favor of 
plaintiff when a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Osguthorpe 
contributed ownership of the Disputed Property to the Oral Partnership, or merely 
contributed the use of the Disputed Property to the Oral Partnership? 
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of 
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without 
according deference to the trial court." Id. 
8. Issue: Did the trial court err when it considered and based its decision, in 
part, on an unauthenticated financial statement which is inadmissible hearsay, utterly 
lacking in any foundation. This issue was preserved for appeal in the appellants' 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Rule 54(b) Motion to Reconsider the Prior 
Grant of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
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Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of 
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without 
according deference to the trial court." Id.. 
9. Issue: Did the trial court err when it concluded that the Dissolution 
Agreement explicitly identified the Disputed Property to be property of the Oral 
Partnership? 
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of 
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without 
according deference to the trial court." Id. 
10. Issue: Did the trial court err when it determined, as a matter of law, that 
the anti-alienation provisions of the Dissolution Agreement do not constitute an 
unreasonable restraint against alienation of the Disputed Property? 
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of 
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without 
according deference to the trial court." Id. 
11. Issue: Did the trial court err when it denied defendants' Motion to amend 
their answer and assert a counterclaim? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review of denial of a motion to amend 
pleadings is abuse of discretion. Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 830 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah 
4 
1992). 
12. Issue: Did the trial court err when it determined the amount of damages 
on summary judgment? 
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of 
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without 
according deference to the trial court." Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah App. 
1994) (citations omitted). 
13. Issue: Did the trial court err when it determined, as a matter of law, that 
the Lease Agreement, and the amendments to that agreement, was not, in fact, an 
easement. 
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of 
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without 
according deference to the trial court." Id. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1953), Estate or interest in real property. See Addendum 3. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1953), Leases and contracts for interest in lands. Id. 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-5 (1953), Partnership property. Id. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12, Defenses and Objections. See Addendum 4. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15, Amended and Supplemental Pleadings. Id. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 19, Joinder of Persons Needed For Just Adjudication. Id. 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 54, Judgments; costs. Id. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56, Summary judgment. Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This appeal is from the final judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, 
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki, Judge, determining that certain real property, title to which 
now is held in fee simple by one of the defendants, D. A. Osguthorpe Family 
Partnership ("OFP"), and held in fee simple at times material hereto by D. A. 
Osguthorpe, is property of a dissolved oral partnership and that plaintiff ("Smith") is 
entitled to receive a portion of the payments received by the defendants from third 
parties, pursuant to a contract to which Smith is not a party.1 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Smith sought partial summary judgment on liability and D. A. Osguthorpe and 
OFP filed a cross-motion for summary' judgment to have the action dismissed and also 
filed a motion to amend the answer filed and assert a counterclaim. The trial court 
denied D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP's motions and granted partial summary judgment in 
favor of Smith and against them. D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP then filed a motion to 
reconsider, as well as a second motion for summary judgment and a new motion to 
amend. Smith filed his motion for summary judgment to resolve the issue of damages 
in his favor and to obtain a complete judgment. 
1
 That contract being an agreement between D. A. Osguthorpe, D.A. 
Osguthorpe Family Partnership, Stephen Osguthorpe, and ASC Utah, Inc. ("ASCU 
contract" or "ASCU agreement") (see Statement of Facts for more detailed information). 
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The trial court reconsidered its original ruling, yet denied the second motion for 
summary judgment and ruled that summary judgment should be entered in favor of 
Smith and against D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP. D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP filed a 
motion to dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties, in the form of Stephen 
Osguthorpe and ASCU, who were parties to the ASCU Agreement that was being 
interpreted by the trial court in assessing damages. The trial court denied the motion to 
dismiss, conceded that Stephen Osguthorpe and ASCU had an interest in the contract, 
but resolved that problem, not by joining them, as the rule requires, but instead by 
offering them the opportunity, within ten (10) days, to file a form of amicus 
memorandum opposing the summary judgment. Stephen Osguthorpe took advantage 
of that invitation and did file such a memorandum. ASCU took the position that it was 
not a party and would not do anything in response to the trial court's invitation. 
After a hearing, again, on the summary judgment issues, the court reaffirmed its 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Smith and against D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP, 
and a final judgment was entered and timely appealed to this Court. 
C. Disposition By Trial Court. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and this appeal 
followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
General Factual Background: 
1. Prior to 1959, D.A. Osguthorpe, individually operated a sheep and cattle 
business. As part of that business, D. A. Osguthorpe was the owner of and grazed his 
7 
sheep and cattle on the real property which is the subject of this action. June 21, 1999 
Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe, R. 116,1J 2; April 21, 2000 Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe, 
R. 258,H1. 
2. In approximately 1959, Enoch Smith, Jr.2 and D. A. Osguthorpe formed a 
partnership, by oral agreement, for the purpose of operating a sheep and cattle 
business (the "Oral Partnership"). Id., R. 117, U 3. 
3. Prior to the formation of the Oral Partnership, D. A. Osguthorpe owned 
fee title to all of the subject real estate. Fee title to the subject real estate was never 
transferred from D. A. Osguthorpe to the Oral Partnership; rather, Smith asserts that 
the 1966 Document constitutes a transfer. Id., R. 117, % 4. 
4. The Oral Partnership was solely the product of an oral agreement 
between Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe and was never reduced to writing. April 21, 2000 
Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe, R. 258, fl 3. 
5. When the Oral Partnership was created in approximately 1959, D. A. 
Osguthorpe never intended or agreed to make the subject real estate a part of the 
assets owned by the Oral Partnership. Similarly, at no time after the Oral Partnership 
was created did D. A. Osguthorpe ever intend or agree to or actually make the subject 
real estate a part of the assets of the Oral Partnership. D. A. Osguthorpe never signed, 
delivered or recorded any deed transferring ownership of the subject real estate from 
himself to the Oral Partnership or any other person while the Oral Partnership was in 
existence. April 21, 2000 Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe, R. 258, H 4 
2
 "Smith," as used herein, refers to both decedent and, where the context 
requires, his personal representative. 
8 
6. The assets of the Oral Partnership consisted solely of the sheep and 
cattle that Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe owned through the Oral Partnership. The Oral 
Partnership owned no real property anywhere. Id. 
7. The record below is uncontroverted that the public record indicates the 
conveyance to D. A. Osguthorpe of fee title in and to the subject real estate was 
recorded on April 1, 1958; no interest in the subject real estate was ever conveyed to 
the Oral Partnership; and title in and to the subject real estate remained solely in the 
name of D. A. Osguthorpe until 1989, when parcel 1 of the subject real estate was 
conveyed to the D. A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership ("OFP"), and 1998, when parcels 
2 and 3 were conveyed to the Dr. D. A. Osguthorpe Family Trust (also referred to 
herein as "OFP"). Miscellaneous Report of First American Title Insurance Company, R. 
266-271; Warranty Deed conveying subject real property to D. A. Osguthorpe, dated 
03/29/58, recorded in the official records of the Summit County Recorder on 04/01/58, 
R. 272; April 27, 2000 Affidavit of Mary Katherine Johnston, R. 273-277, and 
attachments thereto. 
8. Smith never told D. A. Osguthorpe that Smith intended to make the 
subject real estate a part of the assets owned by the Oral Partnership or ever believed 
the subject real estate was ever made a part of the assets owned by the Oral 
Partnership. April 21, 2000 Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe, R. 258, U 5. 
9. While the Oral Partnership existed, Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe grazed 
the sheep and cattle owned by the Oral Partnership on a variety of properties; 
specifically: 
a. Head of Millcreek Canyon. Before, during and after the Oral 
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Partnership, Osguthorpe owned an undivided interest in this land consisting of 
approximately 960 acres, and, until it was condemned by the U.S. Forest 
Service, D. A. Osguthorpe always used it as the primary grazing grounds for his 
sheep and cattle. D. A. Osguthorpe let the Oral Partnership use this land to 
graze the sheep and cattle owned by the Oral Partnership. 
b. Land West of the present Salt Lake International Airport extending 
to Saltair. This property was owned by Jimmy Hogle and [first name unknown) 
Swaner, consisting of approximately 7,000 acres. The Oral Partnership would 
rent this land for grazing the sheep and cattle owned by the Oral Partnership. 
c. The Swazey permit. Before, during and after the Oral Partnership, 
D. A. Osguthorpe owned this land, located on the east side of the Swazey range, 
through a BLM permit, and still owns this land consisting of approximately 23,000 
acres. D. A. Osguthorpe let the Oral Partnership use this land to graze the 
sheep and cattle owned by the Oral Partnership. 
d. Park City, mouth of Iron Canyon. This land was owned by Enoch 
Smith, Jr. consisting of approximately 275 acres. The Oral Partnership used this 
land for grazing the sheep and cattle owned by the Oral Partnership. 
e. Land east of Red Pine. Before, during and after the Oral 
Partnership, D. A. Osguthorpe owned an undivided interest in this land 
consisting of 20 acres near what is now the home of his son, Stephen 
Osguthorpe, and has always used this land as the primary gathering area for the 
sheep in the spring and fall. He still uses it for that purpose today. 
f. The East Ranch. Before, during and after the Oral Partnership, D. 
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A. Osguthorpe owned an undivided interest in this land east of Park City 
consisting of approximately 240 acres. D. A. Osguthorpe let the Oral Partnership 
use this land for grazing the sheep and cattle owned by the Oral Partnership. 
g. The Lower Ranch. Before, during and after the Oral Partnership, 
D. A. Osguthorpe owned an undivided interest in this land at Snyderville Basin 
consisting of approximately 160 acres. D. A. Osguthorpe let the Oral Partnership 
use this land for grazing the sheep and cattle owned by the Oral Partnership, 
h. Bear Hollow. This land was owned by Lou Felton consisting of 
approximately 250 acres. The Oral Partnership would rent this land for grazing 
the sheep and cattle owned by the Oral Partnership. 
i. Red Pine. Before, during and after the Oral Partnership, D. A. 
Osguthorpe owned an undivided interest in this land north of Park City (generally 
including the subject real estate) consisting of approximately 564 acres. When 
the Oral Partnership used this land, it was only for the purpose of transferring 
the sheep and cattle to and from the gathering area east of Red Pine and the 
primary grazing lands in Millcreek Canyon, which was over the hill from Red 
Pine. The Oral Partnership never used the Red Pine land to graze the sheep 
and cattle owned by the Oral Partnership. 
Id., R 258-260, fl 6. 
10. An unauthenticated and inadmissable hearsay1965 financial statement, 
prepared by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., was offered by Smith to show that the Oral 
Partnership owned some unidentified "unencumbered land" valued at $23,711.25. July 
8, 1999 Affidavit of Enoch Richard Smith, R. 138-142. Until that document was 
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produced in connection with this lawsuit, D. A. Osguthorpe had never seen, approved, 
or ratified the statement and under oath disavowed it as any financial statement for and 
on behalf of the Oral Partnership because the Oral Partnership never owned any real 
property. If the financial statement were somehow admissible, it is, nevertheless, 
materially incorrect, in addition to being inadmissable. Id., R. 261, fl 8. 
11. In 1966, Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe determined to dissolve the Oral 
Partnership. At that time, Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe verbally agreed that they would 
set a date by which either of them could purchase the interest in the Oral Partnership 
and assets of the Oral Partnership of the other for $50,000.00 in cash (the "Oral 
Dissolution Agreement"). If only one of them had the $50,000.00 on that date, the other 
would be required to sell. If both of them had $50,000.00 on that date, they would 
determine by toss of a coin which of them would sell and which would purchase. On 
the specified date, D. A. Osguthorpe had $50,000.00 and Smith did not. On that date, 
D. A. Osguthorpe tendered payment of the $50,000.00 to Smith and Smith accepted 
that payment. 
12. Subsequent to D. A. Osguthorpe's payment of $50,000.00 cash to Smith, 
and Smith's acceptance thereof in full performance of the dissolution agreement, D. A. 
Osguthorpe was informed by O. W. Moyle, Jr. of the law firm of Moyle & Draper, that 
Smith desired that D. A. Osguthorpe sign a document to memorialize agreement 
relating to the dissolution of the Oral Partnership pursuant to the Oral Dissolution 
Agreement. At that time, Mr. Moyle presented D. A. Osguthorpe with a draft copy of the 
document (the "1966 Document") D. A. Osguthorpe was informed by Mr. Moyle that the 
1966 Document had been drafted by Mr. Moyle at the request of Smith. June 21, 1999 
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Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe, R. 117-118, H 6. 
13. Prior to signing the 1966 Document, D. A. Osguthorpe reviewed the 1966 
Document with Mr. Moyle and expressed concern that D. A. Osguthorpe was being 
required to sign the 1966 Document despite the fact that Smith had already sold all of 
Smith's interest in the Oral Partnership and the assets of the Oral Partnership to D. A. 
Osguthorpe for $50,000.00, and despite the fact that D. A. Osguthorpe had already 
paid the $50,000.00 purchase price to Smith and Smith had accepted payment. D. A. 
Osguthorpe also expressed concern to Mr. Moyle about the language contained in the 
1966 Document that purported to require D. A. Osguthorpe to share future profits from 
the sale or lease of the subject real estate with Smith. Id., R. 118, H 8. 
14. In response to D. A. Osguthorpe's concerns, Mr. Moyle assured D. A. 
Osguthorpe that so long as D. A. Osguthorpe continued to use the subject real estate 
as grazing land in connection with the operation of D. A. Osguthorpe's sheep or cattle 
operation, D. A. Osguthorpe could use the subject real estate in any manner he 
determined and D. A. Osguthorpe would never need to pay any monies to Smith, /of., 
R. 118-119,1|9. 
15. With that assurance, D. A. Osguthorpe signed the 1966 Document on or 
about November 3,1966. In signing the 1966 Document, it was D. A. Osguthorpe's 
understanding that D. A. Osguthorpe would not be required to pay anything to Smith 
with respect to the use of the subject real estate so long as D. A. Osguthorpe continued 
to use the subject real estate as grazing land in connection with D. A. Osguthorpe's 
operation of a sheet and cattle operation. D. A. Osguthorpe intended to continue using 
the subject real estate as grazing land in the operation of his sheep and cattle business. 
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/of.,R. 119, U 10. 
16. In drafting the 1966 Document and in his meetings with D. A. Osguthorpe, 
Mr. Moyle was representing Smith. Mr. Moyle was not representing D. A. Osguthorpe. 
D.A. Osguthorpe was not represented by counsel in connection with the drafting and 
execution of the 1966 Document and relied on the representations of Mr. Moyle in 
making his decision to sign the 1966 Document, /of., R. 119, fl 11. 
17. The $50,000.00 paid to Smith by D. A. Osguthorpe was equal to or 
greater than the then-current market value of all of Smith's interest in the Oral 
Partnership and the assets of the Oral Partnership. Id., R. 119, If 12. 
18. At all times since the dissolution of the Oral Partnership, D. A. Osguthorpe 
has operated a sheep business. From time to time since the dissolution of the Oral 
Partnership, D. A. Osguthorpe has operated a cattle business in addition to the 
operation of his sheep business. At all times since the dissolution of the Oral 
Partnership, D. A. Osguthorpe has used the subject real estate as grazing lands in 
connection with his sheep and/or cattle business in the same manner as the subject 
real estate was used in D. A. Osguthorpe's sheep and cattle business both prior to the 
formation of the Oral Partnership and after the dissolution of the Oral Partnership. Id., 
R. 119-120,1113. 
19. Since approximately August of 1996, agreements have been entered into 
between D. A. Osguthorpe, the Osguthorpe Family Partnership, and Stephen 
Osguthorpe, on the one hand, and Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C. and its successor, 
ASCU, on the other hand. Documents reflecting part of those agreements are as 
follows: 
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a. Lease Agreement,3 dated August 14, 1996, and signed by D. A. 
Osguthorpe, Osguthorpe Family Partnership, and Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C. 
(the "Lease Agreement"). 
b. An amendment to the ASCU Agreement, dated July 28, 1997, and 
signed by D. A. Osguthorpe, Osguthorpe Family Partnership, Stephen 
Osguthorpe, and The Canyons (formerly Wolf Mountain Resort) (the "First 
Amendment"). 
c. An amendment to the ASCU Agreement, dated August 10, 1998, 
and signed by D. A. Osguthorpe, Osguthorpe Family Partnership, Stephen 
Osguthorpe, and The Canyons (the "Second Amendment"). 
/d., R. 120,1| 14. These agreements, part of which are documented, are referred to 
collectively herein as the "ASCU agreement" or the "ASCU contract." 
20. The ASCU agreement provides, in part, as follows: "Notwithstanding the 
rights granted to Wolf Mountain herein, D. A. Osguthorpe shall be permitted to improve 
and to use the Property provided that such improvements or use does not interfere with 
Ski Lifts and similar structures and runs of Lessee." Lease Agreement, R. 69-70. 
21. The First Amendment requires The Canyons to cooperate and work with 
D. A. Osguthorpe and his authorized representative (Stephen Osguthorpe) in 
connection with the planning and design of the improvements to be constructed on the 
subject real estate by The Canyons. First Amendment, R. 71-72. 
3
 By using the language of the document, D. A. Osguthorpe does not 
concede that it is, legally, a lease. Instead, as argued in Part V below, it is legally an 
easement or license. 
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22. Paragraph 4 of the Second Amendment provides as follows: 
The Canyons acknowledges that under this Agreement, the August 
14, 1996 Agreement and the July 28, 1997 first amendment to the August 
14, 1996 Agreement, the Osguthorpe family and D. A. Osguthorpe have 
retained the right to use all of the property which is the subject of those 
Agreements, as part of their ranch operation (including sheep and cattle) 
and to otherwise use and improve such property, so long as such ranch 
operation and other use and improvements do not damage the towers 
and other facilities constructed on the property by the Canyons (and its 
predecessors in interest) and do not unreasonably interfere with the use 
of the property in the winter as part of the Canyons' winter skiing 
operations. The Canyons agrees that the use of the property by the 
Canyons during the spring, summer, and fall, will not interfere with the 
ranch operations of the Osguthorpe family and D. A. Osguthorpe. 
R. 73-75. 
23. The parties to the ASCU agreement intended the annual payment due 
under the terms of the agreement to be paid in consideration of both the use of the land 
and services to be rendered by D. A. Osguthorpe and Stephen Osguthorpe. Deposition 
of Blaise Carrig, R. 958 at 40:3-12. 
24. The specific reference to the Osguthorpes participating in the master 
planning process was meant to be a reference to the services the Osguthorpes were to 
provide. Blaise Carrig Affidavit, fflj 5-6, R. 762-763. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erroneously entered summary judgment, upon the 1966 
Document, and awarded damages for one-half of the payments made by ASCU to D. A. 
Osguthorpe, OFP, and Stephen Osguthorpe, under the ASCU agreement, despite the 
facts that (1) the 1966 Document, itself, is invalid and unenforceable, or, (2) if valid, its 
plain terms would not impose liability on D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP, and (3) where in 
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any event genuine issues of material fact would prevent summary judgment against D. 
A. Osguthorpe and OFP. 
The 1966 Document is invalid and unenforceable because it does not comply 
with the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, there was no consideration given to D. 
A. Osguthorpe, such that it is not a valid contract, and it constitutes an invalid, 
unreasonable restraint on alienation of real estate. D. A. Osguthorpe was the owner of 
all of the subject real property described in the 1966 Document at all material times. 
There is no evidence of any conveyance of all or any portion of D. A. Osguthorpe's 
interest in that real property to Smith or the Oral Partnership, at any time. Moreover, 
the testimony of D. A. Osguthorpe is uncontroverted that he never intended to and 
never did transfer or convey the subject real property to Smith or the Oral Partnership. 
Thus, where the 1966 Document purports to convey Smith's "interest" in the subject 
real property, Smith had nothing, in fact, to convey. The lack of any definition for 
Smith's purported "interest" also renders the document as violative of the Statute of 
Frauds and unenforceable. 
Additionally, the dissolution of the Oral Partnership had long-previously been 
concluded by way of an oral dissolution agreement, as to which all monies owed were 
paid and all performance complete. Finally, the uncontroverted testimony of D. A. 
Osguthorpe establishes that there was no dispute existing between he and Smith, at 
any time, with respect to the Oral Partnership or its dissolution, the settlement of which 
might provide consideration for the proffered release in the 1966 Document. 
The 1966 Document, in any event, would impose liability upon D. A. Osguthorpe 
and OFP only if there were a "lease" of the subject real property (or sale). The ASCU 
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agreement is clearly not a lease, but instead, some form of license or easement. 
The 1966 Document also provides that D. A. Osguthorpe need not pay anything 
to Smith so long as D. A. Osguthorpe uses the subject real property for grazing his 
sheet and cattle. The uncontroverted testimony is that D. A. Osguthorpe in fact has 
and does continue to graze his own sheep and cattle on the subject real property. 
Because the uncontroverted evidence shows entitlement to judgment in favor of 
D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP of no cause of action and for dismissal of Smith's 
complaint, this Court should enter judgment in D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP's favor 
entirely. In any event, it is clear that genuine issues of material fact preclude any 
summary judgment in favor of Smith on the issue of liability. As to damages, the trial 
court erred in its application of the Statute of Frauds and the parol evidence rule. The 
documents reflecting portions of the ASCU contract are shown by uncontroverted 
evidence not to be integrated agreements. Instead, the uncontroverted evidence of all 
parties to the ASCU agreement shows that the single, annual payment by ASCU to D. 
A. Osguthorpe, OFP and Stephen Osguthorpe (who is not a party to this action) is in 
exchange not only for the use of real estate as the writings describe, but also for the 
provision of services, particularly by Stephen Osguthorpe (not a party to this litigation) 
and that a large portion of that payment is intended to go to Stephen Osguthorpe for 
the services he provides. Thus, the trial court's ruling that the entire annual prepayment 
was for the use of real estate and calculation of damages based on that ruling is 
incorrect. 
Because Stephen Osguthorpe and ASCU both have material interests, as was 
found by the trial court, in the ASCU agreement, the trial court's failure to join them as 
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parties was error. Further, the trial court's failure to allow D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP to 
amend their answer was an abuse of discretion where summary judgment was 
inappropriate. 
A R G U M E N T 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
This case is before this Court for review of the entry of summary judgment in 
favor of Smith and against D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP, on a breach of contract claim, 
and for review of the denial of D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP's motions for summary 
judgment. 
"A trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness." 
Snow v. Rudd, 998 P.2d 262, 265, 2000 UT 20, U 9. "Summary judgment is 
appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, 
Ventulett, Stainback, and Assoc, Inc., 28 P.3d 669, 673, 2001 UT 54, fi 9 (citing Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 
On the record before this Court, the summary judgment entered by the trial court 
against D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP both on liability and on damages is incorrect based 
on the record, and therefore must be reversed. With respect to Smith's motions in that 
regard, genuine issues of material fact clearly exist that preclude summary judgment 
against D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP. 
The trial court's denial of D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP's motion for summary 
judgment is also incorrect based on the record, and must be reversed. The 
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uncontroverted evidence in the record supports judgment in favor of D. A. Osguthorpe 
and OFP, as a matter of law, because Smith has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to 
avoid summary judgment against him in the following respects: (1) the 1966 Document 
does not comply with the Statute of Frauds; (2) there was no consideration for the 1966 
Document; (3) the ACSU agreement was an easement or license, and not a lease, 
thereby not subjecting D. A. Osguthorpe or OFP to liability; (4) the 1966 Document is an 
unreasonable restraint on alienation; and (5) by the 1966 Document's plain terms, D. A. 
Osguthorpe would not have to pay compensation to Smith so long as he continued to 
use his real property for grazing, as he always had in the past and, the uncontroverted 
evidence shows, continues to occur. These issues are more fully addressed below. 
II. THE 1966 DOCUMENT IS NOT A VALID CONTRACT. SMITH HAS FAILED TO 
ADDUCE REQUIRED EVIDENCE OF CONSIDERATION; THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED B Y 
D. A. OSGUTHORPE AND OFP ESTABLISHES AN ABSENCE OF CONSIDERATION. 
A. There is No Consideration for The 1966 Document. 
Smith asserts two items of consideration flowing to D. A. Osguthorpe via the 
1966 document, namely, the sale of an Interest to D. A. Osguthorpe in the real estate 
that ASCU now pays to use and the provision to D. A. Osguthorpe of a release. First, 
as shown below, D. A. Osguthorpe, and not Smith nor the Oral Partnership, was the fee 
owner of the real estate at the time of execution of the 1966 Document and, second, 
there was no dispute existing between Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe, as to which the 
release of any claims would provide consideration. 
1. The Oral Partnership was Already Dissolved, And Its Affairs 
Terminated, Before the 1966 Document Was Signed. 
The uncontroverted evidence in the record establishes that the partnership, 
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established by oral agreement between D. A. Osguthorpe and Smith, had already been 
dissolved and its affairs terminated, itself by oral agreement, long before the contract 
alleged by Smith (the 1966 Document) was ever signed. First, the 1966 Document 
itself recites: "[Smith] and [D.A. Osguthorpe] have heretofore terminated all partnership 
relations entered into by them as partners and have discontinued the partnership 
businesses, dissolved the partnership or partnerships that have heretofore existed 
between them .. . ." R. 7 (emphasis added). Further, although the 1966 Document 
was executed on November 3, 1966, see R. 13-14, the 1966 Document establishes the 
actual date of dissolution "as of the 17th day of January, 1966, effective January 1, 
1966[.]" R. 12, fl 4. The 1966 Document even establishes that notice of that long-
preceding dissolution had "heretofore been published as provided by law." R. 12, ^ f 4. 
The Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe In Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and In Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed June 21, 1999, R. 116-121, provides testimony concerning all of the details of the 
Oral Dissolution Agreement and its performance. Specifically, in paragraph 5 of that 
Affidavit, R. 117, D. A. Osguthorpe's testimony establishes that he and Smith orally 
agreed to set a date upon which either could purchase the interest in the partnership 
and assets of the Oral Partnership of the other for $50,000 cash. If both partners had 
$50,000 cash on that date, the partners would determine by a coin toss who would sell 
and who would purchase. See id. On the specified date, D. A. Osguthorpe had 
$50,000 and Smith did not. See id. D. A. Osguthorpe tendered payment of the 
$50,000 to Smith and Smith accepted that payment. See id.] see also Affidavit of D. A. 
Osguthorpe dated April 21, 2000, filed April 28, 2000, R. 299-306, U 13 (to same effect); 
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Deposition of D. A. Osguthorpe, taken November 14, 2000, R. 959, at 21:6-28:20 
(describing in some greater detail circumstances described in the affidavits). Thus, the 
uncontroverted facts in the record establish that the oral partnership that had existed 
had already been dissolved by oral agreement and terminated long prior execution of 
the 1966 Document. Nothing was left to do by the time the 1966 Document was 
signed. 
2. D. A. Osguthorpe Has Provided Evidence That He Always 
Owned Full Fee Title, So Nothing Could be Conveyed to Him 
By Smith or the Oral Partnership. 
The trial court confusingly characterized D. A. Osguthorpe's testimony regarding 
the Oral Dissolution Agreement as representing a "claim" by D. A. Osguthorpe "to 
ownership of the disputed property - because of a prior oral agreement with Smith.. .." 
Memorandum Decision at 4, R. 205. The trial court then apparently erroneously 
refused to consider the already-completed dissolution by oral agreement of the Oral 
Partnership, ruling that it was precluded by the Statute of Frauds. See id. However, as 
D. A. Osguthorpe's testimony makes plain, the Oral Dissolution Agreement did not in 
any way encompass any transfer of real estate - the Oral Partnership never owned 
any. 
The Oral Dissolution Agreement had nothing to do with any real estate. To the 
contrary, D. A. Osguthorpe specifically testified that fee title to the property in question 
had been owned by him prior to formation of the Oral Partnership and that he had never 
transferred that real estate to the Oral Partnership. See Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe 
filed June 21, 1999, R. 117, ^ 4 ("Prior to the formation of the Partnership, I owned fee 
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title to all of the Disputed Property. Title to the Disputed Property was never transferred 
from my name to the Partnership."); Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe, filed April 28, 2000 
R. 300, U 4 ("When the oral agreement creating the Partnership was made in 
approximately 1959, I never intended and never agreed to make the Disputed Property 
a part of the assets owned by Partnership. Similarly, at no time after the Partnership 
was created did I ever intend or agree to or actually do so. I never signed, delivered or 
recorded any deed transferring ownership of the Disputed Property from me to the 
Partnership or any other person while the Partnership was in existence. The assets of 
the Partnership consisted solely of the sheep and cattle that Smith and I owned through 
the Partnership. The Partnership owned no real property anywhere. [Emphasis 
added]").4 
It is not only uncontroverted by virtue of D. A. Osguthorpe's testimony that he, 
not Smith or the Oral Partnership, was the owner of the subject real estate, the fact is 
also proven by the expert testimony of Mary Katherine Johnston, a title examiner, in her 
Affidavit, dated April 28, 2000, R. 308-330. Ms. Johnston's affidavit attaches as an 
exhibit, an abstract of the Warranty Deed from Tracy Land & Livestock Company to D. 
A. Osguthorpe, executed March 29, 1958, and recorded April 1, 1959, with the Summit 
County Recorder's Office. See R. 329. Indeed, Smith has specifically and expressly 
conceded that Ms. Johnston's title work is accurate. See Memorandum In Support of 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe and Mary Katherine Johnston, filed May 
17, 2000, R. 421 ("Smith does not dispute the information in the Title Report 
4
 Thus, the Statute of Frauds does not, as Smith argued, apply to the 
already-performed oral agreement to dissolve a partnership that owned no real estate. 
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Although Smith alleged that the subject real estate became partnership property by 
operation of law, he has never disputed D. A. Osguthorpe's statement regarding the 
record title of the Disputed Property.") 
There is also additional evidence, in the form of negative evidence, that in fact 
neither the Oral Partnership nor Smith, individually, held any real property to sell to D. 
A. Osguthorpe (and, also, that nothing was left to do by the time the 1966 Document 
was signed). Paragraph 3 of the 1966 Document has Smith agreeing "to execute and 
deliver to [Osguthorpe] such Assignments, Deeds and Bills of Sale as may be 
necessary to transfer and convey to [Osguthorpe] all of the interests in the partnership 
businesses of [Smith] as hereinabove provided . . . ." R. 12, U 3. Had Smith or the Oral 
Partnership in fact owned real estate, or any interest in the real estate that they would in 
fact sell to D. A. Osguthorpe, Smith could have produced deeds or other documents 
purporting to effectuate actual transfers. 
The absence of such documents merely buttresses D. A. Osguthorpe's 
testimony that he at all times was and remained the owner of the real estate in 
question. Thus, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that: (1) D. A. Osguthorpe 
was the owner of and solely held fee title to the subject real estate at all material times; 
(2) the partnership was formed upon an oral agreement and was dissolved upon an oral 
agreement which called for the purchasing party to pay $50,000 to the other party for all 
interest in the partnership and partnership assets; and (3) the oral dissolution 
agreement had been fully performed and the oral partnership dissolved and terminated 
long prior to the execution of the 1966 Document. 
As has been noted above in the section on standards governing summary 
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judgment, Smith must show entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law. In 
other words, Smith must prove every element of his breach of contract claim. See, e.g. 
Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997) ("On a motion for 
summary judgment, the moving party bears the burden of proof for its motion, namely, 
the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."). The law in Utah is clear that 
the burden of proving consideration is on the party seeking to recover on the contract. 
Dementas v. Estate of Tallas, ex rel. First Security Bank, 764 P.2d 628, 631-32 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) ("If plaintiff fails to show there is consideration to support the contract, 
that party has failed to meet its burden and the contract will be held invalid by the court. 
[Citation omitted.] In a contract action in this state, consideration or a legally sufficient 
substitute for consideration must be established as part of plaintiff's prima facie case.") 
Here, the only proffered evidence of consideration for the 1966 Document is the 
1966 Document itself. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, R. 56-80. Smith has conceded at oral argument that the only evidence to 
support his claim that he or the Oral Partnership had any interest in the subject real 
estate is the 1966 Document. Tr. of July 31, 2000 hearing, R. 956, Tab 2, at 12:17-20 
("What we know about is that we have the [1966 Document]. The [1966 Document] 
says that Smith has an interest in this disputed property. Well, that's the evidence that 
we have."5 The 1966 Document, however, contains no recitals of any previous 
5
 Prior to this concession at oral argument, an unauthenticated, unaudited 
hearsay financial statement, without authentication or foundation, had been proffered 
by Smith. See R. 138-142. Smith had argued that the document showed that the 
(continued...) 
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conveyance by D. A. Osguthorpe to either Smith or the Oral Partnership and the record 
is devoid of any such writing satisfying the Statute of Frauds. Examining the 1966 
Document, R. 7-14, it can be seen that the 1966 Document itself does not have a 
specific recital of any consideration flowing to D. A. Osguthorpe. 
Smith points to paragraph 1(g) of the 1966 Document, R. 9-10, as support for his 
contention that consideration exists. Paragraph 1(g) contains a promise by Smith, 
individually, (not the Oral Partnership) to sell Smith's undefined interest in the subject 
real estate to D. A. Osguthorpe.6 It is noteworthy that paragraph 1(g) refers to some 
undefined individual interest of Smith, rather than any partnership interest in the 
property. Smith's argument that paragraph 1(g) constitutes consideration overlooks a 
fundamental problem Smith has. The real property in question and described in 
paragraph 1(g) has uncontrovertedly been held at all times by D. A. Osguthorpe, not 
Smith and not the Oral Partnership. D. A. Osguthorpe has offered evidence proving his 
5(...continued) 
subject real property was an asset of the Oral Partnership because of an ostensible 
entry on balance sheet for assets under a line item titled "Land (unencumbered)," with 
an ostensible value of $23,711.25. R„ 140. Not only is that document unauthenticated, 
unaudited, lacking in all foundation and clear hearsay, which would prevent its 
admissibility in any event, D. A. Osguthorpe testified that any assertion that the Oral 
Partnership owned land valued at $23,711.25 was false, in that the Oral Partnership 
never owned any real property, including the subject real property. R. 303, fflf 11-12. 
Additionally, D. A. Osguthorpe testified that he and Smith, through the Oral Partnership, 
grazed sheep and cattle over several properties, some owned by D. A. Osguthorpe, 
some by Smith, and some by other parties. R. 300-302, fl 6(a)-(i). In fact, the use of 
the subject real property by the Oral Partnership was limited to trailing sheep and cattle 
and was never used by the Oral Partnership for grazing the partnership's livestock. R. 
302, IT 6(1). 
6
 This argument, as pointed out below in Part H.B.2., itself is invalid 
because it violates the Statute of Frauds by its lack of specificity as to what interest is 
claimed to be conveyed. 
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prior and continuing ownership. 
Smith argued to the trial court that the 1966 Document was a conveyance of D. 
A. Osguthorpe's real estate to the Oral Partnership by virtue of its "declaration," as 
argued by Smith, that the real estate was a "partnership asset" under paragraph 1. 
That argument fails for two reasons. First, the 1966 Document, as pointed out above, 
itself concedes that the Oral Partnership had terminated prior to the time the 1966 
Document was executed (the parties "have heretofore terminated all partnership 
relations entered into by them as partners and have discontinued the partnership 
businesses, dissolved the partnership or partnerships that have heretofore existed 
between them . . . ."). Thus, there was no partnership in existence that could have 
received any conveyance of real estate Smith argues was made by the 1966 
Document. 
Second, paragraph 1 lists partnership assets in subparagraphs (a) through (f) of 
paragraph 1. R. 8-9. Then, in subparagraph (g), which Smith relies on, it states "in 
addition to the above-described property, [Smith] agrees to sell to [D. A. 
Osguthorpe] his interest in7 ihe following described real property . . . subject, however, 
The language of the 1966 Document itself, showing that it was Smith, 
individually, not the Oral Partnership, that agreed to "sell" D. A. Osguthorpe's own 
property to him is significant, because it controverts Smith's argument that the Oral 
Partnership somehow owned an interest in the real estate. Before the trial court, Smith 
had cited to Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-5: "All property originally brought into the 
partnership stock, or subsequently acquired by purchase or otherwise on account of the 
partnership, is partnership property." But that provision does not avail Smith because 
he offers no evidence that D. A. Osguthorpe "originally brought" the real estate "into the 
partnership" or that the subject real property was "subsequently acquired . . . on 
account of the partnership," and the language of the 1966 Document itself that refers to 
"his interest" fl| 1(g), R. 9), meaning the First Party, Smith, rather than the partnership. 
(continued...) 
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to the reservation of interests therein by [Smith] as hereinafter specifically set forth 
[Emphasis supplied.]" R. 9. It is noteworthy that the document never seeks to describe 
what interest, exactly, Smith in fact holds in the real property that he would be selling to 
D. A. Osguthorpe. 
To meet his burden, Smith needed to prove a conveyance by D. A. Osguthorpe 
to him or the Oral Partnership. It is black letter law that "land owned individually by one 
who enters into a partnership cannot become a partnership asset absent some written 
agreement sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds." Ludwig v. Walter, 331 S.E.2d 
177, 179 (N.C. App. 1985) (citing 60 A M . JUR. 2D, Partnership § 98 (1960)) (stating "we 
do not believe the General Assembly intended to abrogate [the Statute of Frauds] by 
enacting the [Uniform Partnership Act]."); Johnson v. Gilbert, 621 P.2d 916, 919 (Ariz. 
App. 1980); Pappas v. Gounaris, 311 S.W.2d 644, 645-46 (Tex. 1958). See also, 45 
A.L.R.2d § 1009, § 5 (1956) (citing cases for the proposition that "land ownership 
individually by one who thereafter enters into a partnership agreement cannot become 
an asset of the partnership in the absence of a written agreement sufficient to satisfy 
the statute [of frauds]); 72 A M . JUR. 2D, Statute of Frauds § 70 (1999) (citing cases for 
the proposition that "in order to place in the partnership the title to property owned by 
one partner at the formation of the partnership, or to make such property a partnership 
asset, the [partnership] agreement must be in writing, the same as any other contract 
for the sale of land."). 
7(...continued) 
Thus, the precise language of the 1966 Document belies Smith's argument that the 
Oral Partnership ever had any interest in the subject real property. 
28 
Shire Development v. Frontier Investments, 799 P.2d 221 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
is on all fours with this black letter law. Frontier sold a piece of property to Glezos 
under a real estate contract. Shortly thereafter, Shire Development (and Albert 
Charboneau) entered into a joint venture agreement with Glezos to participate in the 
purchase, development and sale of the same property from Frontier. Frontier was not a 
party to the joint venture agreement. Shire advanced money to Frontier for the 
purchase of the property. Glezos later defaulted on the real estate contract, and, 
pursuant to the contract, Frontier forfeited Glezos's interest in the property and retained 
the entire amount paid as liquidated damages. Shire sued Frontier under the real 
estate contract. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Frontier, ruling, in part, that 
Shire had no standing to sue under the contract. On appeal, Shire argued the oral joint 
venture agreement constituted an assignment of the real estate contract from Glezos, 
which provided it with standing. Frontier responded that if any assignment had been 
made, it would have involved the transfer of a property interest, and therefore would 
have had to be in writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Id. at 223. This Court agreed. 
If the oral joint venture agreement were construed to be an assignment of real property, 
"it would have to be in writing to comply with the statute of frauds." Id. at 224. 
For the Oral Partnership to acquire an interest (any interest) in the real property 
owned by D.A. Osguthorpe, the conveyance of that interest had to be evidenced by a 
written memorandum evidencing clearly an intent to convey, preferably a deed. See 
Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 899 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995): 
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that the preferred way to transfer an 
interest in land and meet the requirements of the statute of frauds is by 
deed. Wasatch Mines Co. v. Hopkinson, 24 Utah 2d 70, 465 P.2d 1007, 
1010 (1970) (holding that documents purporting to create profit a prendre 
were insufficient under statute of frauds). However, a real property 
interest may be transferred through other documents and memoranda 
revealing an intent to transfer an interest in real property. Id.. . . Words 
that "clearly show intention to grant an easement are sufficient, provided 
the language is certain and definite in its term." Martinez v. Martinez, 93 
N.M. 673, 604 P.2d 366, 368 (1979). 
Id. Having no interest to "sell" to D. A. Osguthorpe, the promise to sell subject to a 
reservation of interest does not constitute anything other than an illusory promise which 
will not suffice for consideration, any more than if Smith had promised to sell D. A. 
Osguthorpe his interest in the Brooklyn Bridge. 
3. Smith Has Offered No Evidence of Any Belief in an Existing, 
Bona Fide Dispute, Such That the Release Would Constitute 
Consideration. 
The other consideration argued by Smith is in the form of the release of 
supposed claims. See 1966 Document, fl 5, R. 12. But Smith has a similar problem 
here, as well. The already-completed dissolution of the Oral Partnership and already-
accepted payment of the purchase price to Smith had occurred before the 1966 
Document was ever signed. The evidence in the record on that issue is 
uncontroverted. In the Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe, filed April 28, 2000, at paragraph 
13, D. A. Osguthorpe testified: "The Partnership was dissolved at that point [when he 
paid $50,000 to Smith and Smith accepted] on those terms by our agreement." R. 304. 
More emphatically, D. A. Osguthorpe testified that, after the acceptance of $50,000 by 
Smith and from that point in time to the point that D. A. Osguthorpe signed the 1966 
Document "Smith and I never sued each other, or otherwise engaged in any kind of 
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dispute over whether the dissolution was in fact completed. After I paid him the 
$50,000, we had no obligations or liabilities to the other. I did not sign the [1966 
Document] in compromise of any claim, none had been or was asserted, and I received 
no consideration whatsoever for signing. I signed only because [Smith's attorney, 
Oscar Moyle] represented that it was necessary to document the dissolution that had 
already occurred." R. 304. 
The uncontroverted testimony is that Smith received the $50,000 he was owed 
by D. A. Osguthorpe, that the dissolution was thereby concluded, that Smith afterward 
raised no dispute of any kind, and that Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe remained friends. 
See R. 959, at 27:18 - 28:20, 33:22 - 36:4; R. 305, fl 17. Absent some evidence of an 
actual existing dispute, there is no consideration offered by any purported release. See 
Jones v. Admiral Insurance Co., 195 Ga. App. 765, 765, 395 S.E. 2d 234, 234 (1990). 
The Utah Supreme Court has noted that consideration would exist in the form of a 
"bargained-for settlement" only where "the parties in good faith believe there is a 
disputed or uncertain claim " England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340, 342 (Utah 1997). 
Since no such evidence exists in this record, there is no consideration provided by the 
ostensible release of non-existent claims. 
B. There is No Written Memorandum Meeting the Requirements of the 
Statute of Frauds to Show Any Conveyance to Smith or the Oral 
Partnership or Any Interest in the Subject Real Estate That They 
Could Convey Back. 
Smith contends that the 1966 Document, itself, constitutes a conveyance of the 
subject real estate from D. A. Osguthorpe to the Oral Partnership. Smith also contends 
that that same document provides consideration to D. A. Osguthorpe by virtue of 
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paragraph 1(g), where Smith, individually, promises to "sell" to D. A. Osguthorpe his 
"interest" in the subject real property ("[Smith] agrees to sell to [D. A. Osguthorpe], his 
interest in [the subject real property] (emphasis added)." R. 9,1f 1(g). 
1. The 1966 Document does not show a conveyance by D. A. 
Osguthorpe to Smith or the Oral Partnership. 
Smith contends that the 1966 Document, itself, is a sufficient writing, subscribed 
by D. A. Osguthorpe, to convey D. A. Osguthorpe's ownership, because it "declare[s]" it 
to be. This argument ignores, however, the absence of any language evidencing any 
intent on the part of D. A. Osguthorpe to transfer his ownership. To be enforceable 
under the Statute of Frauds, the written memorandum must "stateQ with reasonable 
certainly the essential terms of the . . . contract." See Warburton, 899 P.2d at 781 
("One of the factors to consider in ascertaining the intent of the parties . . . is whether 
the document sufficiently describes the interest granted In a manner sufficient to 
construe the instrument as a conveyance of an interest in land."'); 72 A M . JUR. 2D, 
Statute of Frauds § 214, at 730 (2001) (citing Restatement of Contracts (Second) § 131 
(1979)). The absence of any terms or conditions for the purported transfer by D. A. 
Osguthorpe to the Oral Partnership, and the complete absence of any language 
indicating any intention to make a transfer, grant or conveyance, preclude the 1966 
Document from establishing an interest in the subject real property, is not a sufficient to 
satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 
32 
2. The 1966 Document does not sufficiently describe any 
"interest" Smith purported to convey to D. A. Osguthorpe. 
With respect to the sale of Smith's undefined and nebulous "interest" referred to 
in paragraph 1(g), that, too, is insufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. First and 
foremost, Smith's apparent contention that his "interest" was fee ownership is 
unsupported by any evidence. Thus, the "interest" purporting to be conveyed by the 
1966 Document is inadequate as consideration, and inadequate to meet the 
requirements of the Statute of Frauds: 
Where a seller of land owns only one estate which answers the 
description in the memorandum, that must be taken to be the estate to 
which the memorandum refers, and a memorandum that contains only a 
slight description of such estate will satisfy the requirements of the statute 
of frauds. The fact as to ownership, though not mentioned in the writing, 
clearly appears to be one of the "attending circumstances" to be 
considered by the court in arriving at the true construction of the 
instrument. 
72 A M . JUR. 2D, Statute of Frauds § 246, at 751. Here, the evidence shows no estate 
owned by Smith or the Oral Partnership in the subject real estate sufficient to meet the 
Statute of Frauds. 
The 1966 Document at no time describes any estate or interest in the subject 
real property owned by D. A. Osguthorpe, or, for that matter, the Oral Partnership. It 
simply proffers a property description. Thus, the 1966 Document begs the question of 
whether the "interest" it refers to is a license, a lease for some term, ownership, a 
property interest of any kind, or no interest at all. Since it does not define what is to be 
conveyed to D. A. Osguthorpe through the "sale" referenced of the "interest" and 
because there is no proof of ownership by Smith of any estate in the real property 
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described, the 1966 Document does not meet the requirements of the Statute of 
Frauds. 
III. THE ALLEGED CONTRACT IS VOID A S AN UNREASONABLE RESTRAINT O N 
ALIENATION. 
As discussed above, D. A. Osguthorpe was the fee owner of the subject real 
estate prior to the creation of the Oral Partnership between Smith and D. A. 
Osguthorpe, he remained the fee owner throughout the duration of the Oral Partnership 
and continued to be the fee owner following the oral dissolution agreement and its 
performance. The provision in the 1966 Document which Smith alleges gives rise to his 
right to receive some portion of the annual payment made to D. A. Osguthorpe, 
Stephen Osguthorpe and OFP by ASCU purports to reserve to Smith an interest in the 
proceeds of sale of the subject real estate, at a price exceeding $20 per acre plus the 
depreciated cost of any fencing D. A. Osguthorpe may have done on the property. The 
provision also purports to grant Smith one-half of any lease payments received by D. A. 
Osguthorpe in excess of $1.60 per acre per year. These anti-alienation provisions of 
the 1966 Document are void because they are an unreasonable restraint on the 
alienation of the subject real property. 
As of this date, Smith's claims under these anti-alienation provisions would have 
encumbered the property for over thirty-five years. In 1998, the Michigan Court of 
Appeals noted: "[l]t is nonetheless relevant to note that, almost without exception, 
conveyances in fee simple requiring the transferee to pay the transferor a percentage of 
the price obtained from any subsequent sale have been held invalid." LaFond v. 
Rumler, 226 Mich.App. 447, 457 n. 5, 574 N.W.2d 40, 45 n.5 (1998). In LaFond, the 
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plaintiff purchased real property from the defendant under an installment sales real 
estate contract. An addendum to the real estate contract required the buyer to pay the 
seller approximately fifty percent of the amount by which the sales proceeds from any 
subsequent sale exceeded the sales price under the original contract. The seller's right 
to participate in the excess sales proceeds continued for a period of fifteen years after 
the date of the installment sales contract. The Michigan court concluded that the 
provisions of the installment sales contract granting the seller the right to participate in 
excess sales proceeds were void as "an unreasonably restraint on alienation." Id. 
Similarly in White v. White, 105 N.J. Super. 184, 251 A.2d 470 (1969), the court 
ruled that the provisions of a will requiring the devisee of real property to share the 
proceeds arising from the any sale of that real property occurring within twenty-five 
years after the decedent's death where void as an unreasonable restraint on alienation, 
noting: "Two of the important objections to restraints are their discouragement of 
improvements and their possible effect in respect to creditors of the owner of the 
property subject to the restraint." 251 A.2d at 473. 
While there appear to be no Utah cases directly on point, Utah courts have 
adopted the general rule that unreasonable restraints on alienation are void as against 
public policy. See Page v. Page, 15 Utah 2d 432, 433, 394 P.2d 612, 613 (1964) ("The 
appellants contend that a restriction on alienation of property for a limited period of time 
entered into by an agreement is not void as being against public policy. First and 
foremost, this provision was repugnant to the nature of a fee simple, for one of its 
essential incidents is the power to alienate. This provision was a disabling restraint in 
form (in contrast to a forfeiture provision)."). 
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Here, the anti-alienation provisions purport to bind not only D. A. Osguthorpe, but 
also D. A. Osguthorpe's successors and assigns. Thus, should D. A. Osguthorpe sell 
the disputed property and pay Smith's alleged share of the sale proceeds to Smith, the 
purchaser of the real estate would, upon a subsequent sale, be required to make a 
similar payment to Smith. Moreover, the anti-alienation provisions do not give D. A. 
Osguthorpe's successors and assigns any credit for prior payments made by D. A. 
Osguthorpe to Smith. Inherent in the anti-alienation provisions of the 1966 Document 
are all of the evils attendant to a direct prohibition on the alienation of the real estate, as 
a result of which this Court can conclude, as a matter of law, that the anti-alienation 
provisions constitute an unreasonable restraint on the alienation of the disputed 
property which should be declared void as a matter of public policy. 
IV. SMITH'S CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE THE 1966 DOCUMENT 
REQUIRES N O PAYMENTS TO SMITH S O LONG AS OSGUTHORPE USES THE REAL 
ESTATE FOR GRAZING LANDS, WHICH H E CONTINUES T O DO. 
Paragraph 1(g) of the 1966 Document, upon which Smith bases his claim and 
which purports to have Smith sell some nebulous and undefined interest in D. A. 
Osguthorpe's own real estate back to him, with a reservation of Smith in some interest, 
clearly states: "So long as [Osguthorpe] shall use said real property as grazing lands in 
connection with his operation of a sheep or cattle business, [Osguthorpe] shall have the 
right to the possession and use of the property without compensation to First Party 
[Smith]. . . ." R. 9 Here, the evidence is undisputed that D. A. Osguthorpe continues to 
use the real property as grazing lands in connection with his operation of a sheep or 
cattle business. R. 119-120, atfl13. Indeed, when D. A. Osguthorpe inquired of Smith's 
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lawyer who was attempting to induce D. A. Osguthorpe to sign the Dissolution 
Agreement, Smith's lawyer, Oscar Moyle, expressly told D. A. Osguthorpe "that so long 
as [Osguthorpe] continued to use the [subject real property] as grazing land in 
connection with the operation of [Osguthorpe's] sheep or cattle operation [Osguthorpe] 
could use the [subject real property] in any manner [Osguthorpe] determined and 
[Osguthorpe] would not need to pay any monies to Smith." June 21, 1999 Affidavit of 
D. A. Osguthorpe, R. 118-119, fl 9; Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe, filed April 28, 2000, R. 
305, ffl 15-17. 
V. BECAUSE D. A. OSGUTHORPE AND OFP RETAIN THE RIGHT TO USE THE 
SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY IN THE ASCU AGREEMENT, IT IS EITHER AN 
EASEMENT OR LICENSE, BUT NOT A LEASE THAT WOULD SUBJECT THEM TO 
ANY PAYMENT OBLIGATION UNDER THE 1966 DOCUMENT. 
The terms of the 1966 Document purport to require D. A. Osguthorpe to make 
payment to Smith only if D. A. Osguthorpe "sells" or "leases" all or any part of the real 
estate. R. 9-10. D. A. Osguthorpe has neither sold nor leased the disputed property, 
but has merely granted a non-exclusive easement or license with respect to portions of 
the real estate, which does not in any way interfere with D. A. Osguthorpe's historical 
and continuing use of the property for grazing in connection with the operation of D. A. 
Osguthorpe's sheep and cattle operations. See R. 119-120, fflj 13-15; R. 959 at 70:6-
9, 73:14-17; 89:8-90:21.8 
8
 The trial court focused on the use of the nomenclature "lease" and 
reference to "lease" payments to come to its conclusion that the grant was a lease. 
See R. 207. This approach elevates form over substance and violates general 
principles of construction. See Lipson v. Hawthorne Indus., Inc., 148 Ga.App. 751, 
753, 252 S.E.2d 639, 641 (1979) ("There is no magic in mere nomenclature, and the 
(continued...) 
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An easement is defined as a "nonpossessory interest in land of another." Jon 
W. Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land., |[1.01 
(1988). The differences between a "lease" and an "easement" have been described as 
follows: 
In theory, easements are easily distinguished from leases. An 
easement is a nonpossessory right to use another's land, whereas a lease 
is a right to exclusive possession of another's property for a limited period 
of time. In practice, the line between easements and leases is less easily 
drawn. Often courts must look behind misleading or ambiguous 
terminology to ascertain the true intent of the parties. A statement that 
the situation is a "lease" or that "rent" is to be paid is evidence of the 
parties' intent, but it does not automatically render the arrangement a 
lease. 
Id. at |f 1.05. In determining whether a particular grant of an interest in land is a lease 
or an easement, "it is critical to distinguish between possession and use." Id. Where 
the right to possession of the encumbered property is retained by the owner "with the 
right to use it for all purposes not forbidden by the contract and with all the 
responsibilities of ownership and control," the right granted by the owner will be 
construed to be an easement as opposed to a lease. Baseball Publishing Co. v. 
Bruton, 302 Mass, 54, 56, 18 N.E.2d 362, 364 (1938) (Rights granted by the owner 
constituted an easement as opposed to a lease even though the document creating 
those rights was titled "Lease No. .").9 
8(.. .continued) 
inquiry of the court is always directed to substance and not form.") 
9
 The same point of distinction exists between a "license" and a lease. See, 
e.g., North Avenue Properties, LLC. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 312 IILApp.3d 182, 
189, 720 N.E.2d 65, 71 (2000) (distinguishing "license" from "lease"); Keller v. 
Southwest North Medical Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah 1998) (same). 
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The trial court ignored the uncontroverted fact that D. A. Osguthorpe retains the 
right to possession and control of the real estate, retains all responsibilities of 
ownership and has never given exclusive possession and/or control of any portion of 
the real estate to ASCU, or its predecessor. ASCU has the right to construct and 
maintain ski-lifts, roads and skiing trails on portions of D. A. Osguthorpe's real estate, 
but D. A. Osguthorpe expressly retains the right to use and improve the property, 
subject only to a covenant not to "damage the towers and other facilities constructed on 
the property by [ASCU].. . and [] not to unreasonably interfere with the use of the 
property in the winter as party of [ASCU's] winter skiing operations." See R. 767, 771. 
The rights granted to ASCU do not constitute a leasehold interest, but a non-
exclusive easement to use portions of the real estate, subject to the retained rights of 
D. A. Osguthorpe. The 1966 Document requires payment to Smith only in the event of 
a sale or lease of the real estate. The trial court erred when it concluded that the real 
property had been leased to ASCU, and its determination in that regard should be 
reversed. 
VI. GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
D. A. OSGUTHORPE AND OFP O N THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES. 
The trial court ruled, on the issue of damages, that the entire annual prepayment 
under the ASCU agreement was exclusively for use of real property, and not for 
services. See R. 606-607, 952. This ruling was entered despite the testimony of all 
parties to the ASCU agreement that the single, annual prepayment was for both use of 
real estate and for services. The trial court excluded that evidence under the parol 
evidence rule. The parties to the ASCU agreement were unanimous in their testimony 
39 
that the writings were not intended as integrations, however, thereby mandating 
consideration of parol evidence. Because only that portion of the payment attributable 
to the value of the use of the real estate would be able to be considered in calculating 
damages, genuine issues of material fact concerning that allocation precluded the 
summary judgment in favor of Smith that the trial court entered. 
A. The ASCU Contract is Not an Integrated Agreement. 
As was noted in the facts recited above, the original agreement between D. A. 
Osguthorpe, OFP and Stephen Osguthorpe, on the one hand, and Wolf Mountain 
Resorts, L.C., on the other hand, had been entered into orally. Part of that agreement 
entailed the use of portions of real estate owned by OFP by Wolf Mountain Resorts, 
L.C. As to that part, a written memorandum was executed to allow Wolf Mountain 
Resorts, L.C. to record its right to use that real property. That written document 
appears at several places throughout the record. See, e.g., R. 518-519. The other 
portion of the single agreement entered into that day called for the provision of services 
to ASCU by D. A. Osguthorpe, OFP, and Stephen Osguthorpe. The Osguthorpes and 
Wolf Mountain agreed on a single price to pay for both the use of real estate and 
services, that price being $100,000, due and payable in advance on August 12 of each 
year. See Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe, dated January 26, 2001, R. 749-760, at ffij 
3-8; Deposition of Blaise Carrig, R. 958 at 38:21-39:4. 
When ASCU became the successor to Wolf Mountain, a modified oral 
agreement was entered into between ASCU, on the one hand, and D. A. Osguthorpe, 
OFP, and Stephen Osguthorpe, on the other hand. R. 520-521. The agreement 
reiterated the previous oral agreement and added a few additional terms. A writing was 
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prepared to reflect summarily some of the terms and to memorialize an additional 
$50,000 increase to the annual prepayment, raising it to $150,000 per year. In the 
writing prepared by the parties on that occasion, a specific reference was to make to 
including "the Osguthorpes in [ASCU's] master planning process," which was meant to 
be a reference to the services the Osguthorpes were to provide.10 
The testimony of all parties to the ASCU agreement that there is a single annual 
prepayment for both use of real estate and receipt of services is uniform, unified and 
consistent. For example, Blaise Carrig, the president of ASCU testified: 
I'm saying we looked at the total agreement for the total of $150,000 to 
include what we talked about in the agreement, but also to include the 
other things that we agreed to in the sheep meadow, which were Steve's 
consultation, Steve's support, Steve's [ability] to help us understand 
things, both politically and in the land use component of the plan, and for 
his ability to help facilitate certain meetings, and the many things that I 
had talked about earlier in the deposition. 
Deposition of Blaise Carrig, R. 958 at 40:3-12. In fact, if ASCU had not obtained the 
agreement for the Osguthorpes to assist them in getting permits and approvals, it 
viewed the use of the land as essentially worthless: "And we never had a reason to 
separate the value of one piece from another. One of the pieces of value is that we 
didn't think that the land, without the support [services] in order to get the permits and 
the continued, ongoing planning and consultation to make the whole operation and 
planning piece work, that the land use was basically worthless if we didn't get the whole 
plan to be successful." Deposition of Blaise Carrig, R. 958 at 38:21-39:4. 
The Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe confirms that the writing was not intended 
See Blaise Carrig Affidavit, fflf 5-6, R. 762-763. 
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to encompass all the terms and conditions of the ASCU agreement. Affidavit of 
Stephen Osguthorpe, dated January 26, 2001, R. 749-760, at ffif 3-8. See also 
Affidavit of Blaise Carrig, R. 761-772, at |f 6 ("Because of the time constraints and the 
unique nature of our relationship with the Osguthorpes, the Amendment is very brief 
and does not include a detailed description of all of the personal services to be provided 
by the Osguthorpes in consideration for the annual payment of $150,000. Instead it 
refers to the parties' obligations to work in good faith and maintain open 
communications. ASCU never intended the Amendment to be a complete recitation of 
all of the services to be provided by the Osguthorpes in consideration for the annual 
payment."). 
The law is very clear that all such extrinsic evidence is admissible for determining 
whether the parties intended documents to be integrations. See Union Bank v. 
Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985) ("Therefore, a court must first determine 
whether the writing was intended by the parties to be an integration. In resolving this 
preliminary question of fact, parol evidence, indeed any relevant evidence, is 
admissible."). The uncontroverted evidence here establishes that the parties to the 
ASCU contract never intended the writings to be an integration of the entire agreement. 
The trial court, by its ruling, impermissibly rewrote the contract between Stephen 
Osguthorpe, D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP, on the one hand, and ASCU on the other 
hand, to something completely different from that the parties actually agreed. Applying 
the parol evidence rule in such a fashion to destroy all the parties' own expressed 
intentions and agreements between them, which are freely admitted by all of them, is 
not permissible. 
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B. Smith, Who Is Neither a Party Nor an Intended Third-Party 
Beneficiary of the ASCU Contract, Has No Standing To Assert, And Is 
Incorrect in His Assertion of, the Parol Evidence Rule or the Statute 
of Frauds. 
1. Statute of Frauds. 
In Garland v. Fleischmann, the Utah Supreme Court expressly held that a litigant 
"is not entitled to raise the defense of the statute of frauds [where the litigant] was not a 
party to the contract, nor. . . in privity to a party to the contract." Garland v. 
Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1992). The Garland case quoted with approval, 
the following language: "If the parties to the contract as in this case are willing to waive 
the requirements of the statute, a stranger to the contract cannot object." Id. (quoting 
Zwaska v. Irwin, 52 N.J. Super. 27, 33, 144 A.2d 554, 557 (1958)). Thus, Smith, who is 
a stranger to the contract and who is not an intended third-party beneficiary "lacks 
standing to raise the . . . statute of frauds." Garland. 831 P.2d at 109. 
Moreover, the trial court's ruling that the oral portion of the agreement was not 
enforceable due to the statute of frauds is, in any event, legally incorrect. "It is the 
intent and purpose of the Statute of Frauds to give to the party to an oral contract 
against whom the enforcement of the contract is sought by the other party the right to 
avail himself of the provisions of the Statute as a defense to his liability." Id. (emphasis 
in original) (citing 3 Samuel Williston, A Treatise On The Law Of Contracts § 530, at 
746 (3d Ed. 1960)). The Garland court also cited Fielland v. Wemhoff, 249 N.W. 2d 
634, 638 (Iowa 1977), for the proposition that "if both parties admit the existence of an 
oral contract, it is irrelevant that a stranger objects[.]" Id. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-
201(3)(b) (allowing enforcement of contract, for sale of goods, that does not satisfy the 
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Statute of Frauds, where the party against whom enforcement is sought admits that a 
contract was made). 
Further, the undisputed evidence shows the actual performance of the contract 
precisely as the parties describe the contract. Stephen Osguthorpe and D. A. 
Osguthorpe provided services to ASCU and received the single annual payment and 
nothing else in return for those services. Because of the actual performance of 
services requested by ASCU under the agreement, ASCU would not be in a position to 
repudiate the agreement. See Green v. Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117, 122 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) ("Under the equitable doctrine of part performance, a court will sometimes apply 
estoppel to enforce an oral or implied agreement which has been partially or fully 
performed in reliance on the agreement."). See also Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-8 (allowing 
power to compel specific performance of a contract "in case of part performance 
thereof.") It would be highly anomalous to place Smith, a total stranger to the contract, 
in a better position than ASCU would be, in Smith's efforts to hide from the court the 
services portion of the contract that was not placed in detail in the writing. Cf. Eie v. St 
Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Utah 1981) ("Though [the contract is] 
arguably clear on its face, where the parties demonstrate by their actions that to them 
the contract meant something quite different, the intent of the parties will be enforced."). 
2. Parol Evidence. 
As with the issue of standing to assert the Statute of Frauds, courts have held 
that a party lacks standing to assert the parol evidence rule where it is a stranger to the 
contract at issue. See, e.g., In re Gatlinburg Motel Enterprises, Ltd. (Newton v. 
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Herskowitz), 119 B.R. 955 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1990) (parol evidence rule has reference 
"only to the parties to the instrument."); Director of Revenue v. Loethen Amusement, 
Inc., 753 S.W.2d 334, 335 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (state's director of revenue who "was 
not a party" or "in privity with the parties" "had no standing to invoke the parol evidence 
rule."); Nelson v. United Fire Insurance Company of New York, 275 S.C. 92, 96, 267 
S.E.2d 604, 606 (1980) ("The inadmissibility of parol evidence to vary the terms of a 
written instrument does not apply to a controversy between a third party and one of the 
parties to the instrument."); Scofield v. Greer, 185 F.2d 551, 552 (5th Cir. 1951) (Parol 
evidence rule not violated by admission of testimony where party seeking to invoke rule 
"was not a party or privy of a party to such written agreement," because "the parol 
evidence is not applicable."). 
Even if Smith had standing to assert the parol evidence rule as to the ASCU, the 
extrinsic evidence offered by D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP is uncontroverted with regard 
to the fact that none of the parties intended the writings to be integrated agreements. 
Parol evidence is always admissible for the required initial determination of whether a 
writing was intended by the parties to be an integration. See Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. 
Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 266, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (1972): 
Whether a document was or was not adopted as an integration may be 
proved by any relevant evidence. . . . In determining the issue of the 
completeness of the integration and writing, evidence extrinsic to the 
writing itself is admissible. Parol testimony is admissible to show the 
circumstances under which the agreement was made and the purpose for 
which the instrument was executed. 
Id. See also Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, 890 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1995) 
("Before considering the applicability of the parol evidence rule in a contract dispute, the 
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court must first determine that the parties intended the writing to be an integration. To 
resolve this question of fact, any relevant evidence is admissible.") It is also always 
admissible to show absence of consideration. See Miller v. Archer, 749 P.2d 1274, 
1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("Even if a written agreement appears to be completely 
integrated, parol evidence is admissible to establish whether there was consideration 
for a promise.") 
C. Since the Uncontroverted Evidence That the Annual Payment Is for 
Both Use of Real Estate and Personal Services, and a Large Amount 
of That Payment Belongs to Stephen Osguthorpe, No Judgment on 
Damages Could Property Be Entered on Summary Judgment. 
The foregoing discussion clearly establishes that the written portions of the 
ASCU agreement were not intended to be integrated. To the contrary, the broader 
agreement for the provision of services by the Osguthorpes, and particularly Stephen 
Osguthorpe, who has no arguable liability to Smith under the 1966 Document, 
establishes genuine issues of material fact in allocating the annual ASCU pre-payment 
between use of real property and services. Such genuine issues of material fact 
preclude summary judgment. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO JOIN STEPHEN OSGUTHORPE AND ASCU As 
PARTIES IS REVERSIBLE. 
D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP moved to dismiss, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(7) because Smith had not joined Stephen Osguthorpe and ASCU as parties, 
despite the fact that Smith was seeking through his action to affect the contract 
between ASCU on the one hand, and D. A. Osguthorpe, OFP and Stephen Osguthorpe 
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on the other hand. Rule 19(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that a party 
must be joined as a party in an action if: 
(1) in his [the third party's] absence complete relief cannot be accorded 
among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the 
subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in 
his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to 
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject 
to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, 
the court shall order that he be made a party. 
Thus, "an indispensable party is one 'whose presence is required for a full and 
fair determination of his rights as well as of the rights of other parties to the suit.'" Call v. 
City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1054 (Utah. Ct. App. 1990) (Citing, inter alia, 
Bonneville Tower Condominium Management Comm. v. Thompson Michi Assocs., 728 
P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1986)). "[B]y requiring joinder of necessary parties, Rule 19(a) 
protects the interests of parties who are present by precluding multiple litigation and 
contradictory claims over the same subject matter as the original litigation." Kemp v. 
Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1984). Rule 19(a) also served to "guard against the 
entry of judgments which might prejudice the rights of such parties in their absence." 
Id. (quoting Sanpete County Water Conservancy District v. Price Water Users 
Association, 652 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Utah 1982)). The issue in question, therefore, is 
whether this action affects the ASCU contract rights of D. A. Osguthorpe, Stephen 
Osguthorpe, OFP or ASCU. 
The trial court rewrote the agreement in ruling that no portion of the single pre-
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payment was for services.11 That ruling immediately affected the relationship between 
all of the parties to the ASCU agreement, including Stephen Osguthorpe and ASCU, 
who were not parties to the litigation. The trial court made a specific finding that 
"although they may not claim an interest in the litigation in general, The Canyons and 
Stephen Osguthorpe do have an interest with respect to the September 13, 2000 
Memorandum Decision [ruling that the entire annual paymient was for use of real estate, 
not provision of services]."12 R. 725. Nevertheless, having so found ASCU and 
Stephen Osguthorpe necessary parties, the trial court did not order them joined, but 
instead invited them to file memoranda expressing their positions. See R. 956, Tab 4, 
at 10:12 -14:5. When garnishments issued, the dilemma created by the trial court's 
rewriting of the ASCU contract became real. See R. 957, at 14:1 -17:25. 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING AMENDMENT. 
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to amend the 
answer by leave of Court, "and leave of Court shall be freely given when justice so 
requires." Rule 15(a) is interpreted liberally to allow the parties to have their claims fully 
pleaded and adjudicated. 77mm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1182-83 (Utah 1993). 
The primary consideration in determining whether leave should be granted is whether 
the parties have had adequate notice to meet new issues and whether any party 
receives an unfair advantage or disadvantage. Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 
11
 Generally, it is inappropriate for courts to rewrite contracts for the parties 
thereto. See, e.g., Alfv. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1277 (Utah 
1993) ("Courts will not rewrite a contract for the parties."); Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P.2d 
391, 392 (Utah 1984) ("Neither may a court rewrite the parties' contract."). 
12
 See R. 606-607, 952. 
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786 P.2d 1350 (Utah App. 1990), cert denied, 795 P.2d 1135. 
Here, after obtaining new counsel, D. A. Osguthorpe sought leave to amend his 
answer. R. 331-353. The trial court implicitly denied that motion when it entered 
summary judgment. R. 602-608. The trial court did not mention the motion to amend, 
but it is certainly an abuse of discretion not to allow amendment upon remand, if one is 
necessary. Thus, the trial court's ruling should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the trial court should have entered judgment in favor of D. A. 
Osguthorpe and OFP, and against Smith for the following reasons: (1) There was no 
evidence conforming to the Statute of Frauds that D. A. Osguthorpe ever conveyed real 
estate to the Oral Partnership or Smith, and the uncontroverted evidence is that he 
always maintained fee title in the subject real property; (2) There was no consideration 
for the 1966 Document; (3) The 1966 Document constitutes an unreasonable restraint 
on alienation; (4) D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP continued to use the real estate for 
grazing lands, and are thus not liable under the 1966 Document; and (5) The 1966 
Document constitutes an easement or license, not a "lease" that would subject them to 
liability. 
The uncontroverted evidence establishes D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP's right to 
summary judgment. If summary judgment were not granted in their favor, however, that 
same evidence clearly raises genuine issues of material fact which would preclude any 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Smith. 
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and judgment entered in favor 
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of D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP, or, alternatively, the case remanded to resolve genuine 
issues of material by way of a trial. On remand, if any, D. A. Osguthorpe and OFP 
should be allowed to amend their pleadings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \\ day of January, 2002. 
)AVID W. SCOFIELD 
Attorneys for the Appellants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
ENOCH SMITH, JR. 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
D.A. OSGUTHORPE, an individual, 
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Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Court Clerk: Janet Banks 
May 25, 2001 
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Third Judicial District 
MAY 2 5 2001 
SALT Jto«J0UNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
a review of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment following 
additional briefing. The Court heard oral argument with respect to 
the matter on April 16, 2001. Following the hearing, the issue was 
taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motion, memoranda, exhibits 
attached thereto and for the good cause shown hereby enters the 
following ruling. 
Plaintiff filed this Complaint alleging, pursuant to a 
Partnership Dissolution Agreement, he was entitled to his share of 
proceeds from the Lease Agreement between D. A. Osguthorpe and The 
Canyons. On December 15, 1999, this Court issued its Memorandum 
Decision holding Enoch Richard Smith ("Smith") was entitled to "his 
share" of the lease proceeds paid to the Osguthorpes by The Canyons 
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under the Lease Agreement. 
During a subsequent deposition of The Canyons, the general 
manager, Blaise Carrig ("Carrig'') , stated that under an oral "hand 
shake" side agreement the Osguthorpes were also obligated to 
perform personal services for The Canyons in return for the 
payments. Carrig, however, admitted there was nothing in the Lease 
Agreement that mentioned the provision of these services, nor the 
portion of the (lease) payments that were attributable to these 
services. 
Based upon the aforementioned, defendant filed a motion asking 
the Court to reconsider its grant of summary judgment. A month 
later, plaintiff moved for summary judgment arguing that all the 
proceeds paid under the Lease Agreement were payments for the lease 
of real property. In its Memorandum Decision of September 13, 
2000, the Court ruled in favor of plaintiff holding that any 
alleged modification of the Lease Agreement to include personal 
services was (1) barred by the statute of frauds and (2) 
unenforceable due to the lack of specific terms of the modification 
agreement. 
Defendant subsequently submitted a Motion to Dismiss for 
Failure to Join Indispensable Parties (specifically, Stephen 
Osguthorpe and The Canyons). In January of this year, the Court 
held that although The Canyons and Steve Osguthorpe do not have an 
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interest in the litigation in general, they do have an interest 
with respect to the September 13, 2000 Memorandum Decision. 
Accordingly, while not granting their motion to dismiss, the Court 
allowed Stephen Osguthorpe ("Stephen") and The Canyons to file 
their opposition, if any, to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
In his opposition, Stephen argues that none of the written 
documents executed were intended to be integrated agreements that 
encompassed all of the terms and conditions of the agreement of the 
parties. According to Stephen, the payments to be made by Wolf 
Mountain, and then The Canyons, were at all times intended to be 
both for use of real estate and principally for services to be 
provided by the Osguthorpes. It is Stephen's position the 
documents were prepared solely to reflect in writing the right of 
Wolf Mountain and of The Canyons to use the certain specified real 
property and were never intended to be representative of the entire 
contract. Stephen contends the payment made by Wolf Mountain, and 
subsequently The Canyons, was to be for services provided by the 
Osguthorpes and such is outlined in the terms and conditions of the 
verbal agreement between Wolf Mountain, The Canyons, and D. A. and 
Stephen Osguthorpe. 
In support of his position, Stephen argues that before the 
Court could consider granting summary judgment, it must make a 
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finding that the documents were intended to be an integration, and 
"to resolve this question of fact, any relevant evidence is 
admissible." Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, 890 P.2d 1024, 
1027 (Utah 1995) . As to the Statute of Frauds, Stephen contends it 
is not applicable as everyone, but Smith, agreed it existed and, 
regardless, Smith has no standing to raise this defense as he is 
not a party to the claimed contracts between the Osguthorpes and 
The Canyons. Further asserts Stephen, the Court's ruling 
contravenes the U.S. constitutional proscription of the State's 
power to impair the obligation of contract. Finally, it is 
Osguthorpe's position The Canyons is a necessary party to the 
action and has yet to be joined.1 
Plaintiff, in further support of his motion, argues the Lease 
Agreement and its amendments are clear, unambiguous and integrated. 
Furthermore, asserts plaintiff, the testimony of Stephen and Carrig 
is barred by the Statute of Frauds and Parole Evidence Rule. With 
respect to the Statute of Frauds, specifically, plaintiff contends 
Smith is not a stranger to the contract as the Partnership 
Dissolution Agreement, which gives rise to the entire litigation, 
gives him the right to protect his interest in half the lease 
According to the Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe, The 
Canyons is unwilling to file anything due to the fact that they 
have not been joined as a party. This assertion is based upon a 
letter from The Canyons counsel to his counsel dated January 25, 
2001. 
—iflvi 
SMITH v. OSGUTHORPE Page 5 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
payments. Accordingly, it is plaintiff's position he is in privity 
with the Osguthorpe's with respect to any agreements they may enter 
into affecting his right to those lease payments.2 
Additionally asserts plaintiff, the "personal service" 
contracts between The Canyons and the Osguthorpes are not 
enforceable as they lack definite terms. Indeed, notes plaintiff, 
in his affidavit Stephen acknowledges that the terms of the 
personal service portion of the agreement were never agreed upon, 
rather, how he and his father divided the payments made by The 
Canyons was their business. This argument, according to plaintiff, 
lacks merit because defendants owed a duty to Smith, under the 
Partnership Dissolution Agreement, to identify the amount of the 
lease payments. It is plaintiff's position the Osguthorpes cannot 
be free to simply decide themselves how much to pay Smith. 
With respect to the constitutional issue, plaintiff argues 
such is specious as courts routinely decide whether contracts are 
enforceable. Indeed, it is well settled the contract clause refers 
only to the law of the state and not judicial decisions. See Rawls 
v. Sundquist, 929 F. Supp. 284, affirmed 113 F.3d 1235 (M.D. Tenn 
2,?Privity may be implied by law between the promisor and the 
person to whom the consideration belongs, even though the latter 
is not a party to the contract." 17 Am Jur 2d Contracts § 425. 
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(1996) .3 
Finally as to joinder of The Canyons, Smith notes the Court 
invited it to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment, not a 
rearguing of the joinder issue, and since they chose not to file 
any memorandum, the issue is moot. 
After reviewing the record in this matter, and considering the 
additional briefing, the Court remains convinced of the accuracy of 
its September 13, 2000 Memorandum Decision regarding plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment. Indeed, no matter how the evidence is 
viewed, it is clear defendant's claim to a side oral agreement is 
barred by the Statute of Frauds. See Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3.4 In 
this case, the lease between The Canyons and Osguthorpe was for a 
term of 28 years. Accordingly, it was required to be in writing. 
Furthermore, the Statute of Frauds also requires that any 
modification be in writing. 
While defendant takes issue with the applicability of the 
3After reviewing the relevant case law, the Court is 
persuaded defendants' constitutional argument lacks merit for the 
reasons as set forth by plaintiff. 
4 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer 
period than one year, or for the sale, of any 
lands, or any interest in lands, shall be 
void unless the contract, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed 
by the party by whom the lease or sale is to 
be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized in writing. 
— I Q f f 
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statute arguing plaintiff was not a party to arrangement between 
the Osguthorpes and The Canyons, it is clear the Partnership 
Dissolution Agreement of November 3, 1966 gives Smith the right to 
protect his interest in half the lease payments and provides him 
privity with respect to any agreements entered into affecting his 
right to those lease payment. 
Finally, defendant seeks to take this matter out of the 
Statute of Frauds asserting there has been part performance of the 
services. This argument, however, lacks merit as well for such an 
exception only applies to matters involving specific performance of 
real estate contracts, which is not the situation in the case at 
bar.5 
Based upon the forgoing, the September 13, 2000 Memorandum 
Decision remains the ruling of the Court. 
Dated this -^«* day of May, 2001. 
5Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-8 provides: 
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be 
construed to abridge the powers of courts to 
compel the specific performance of agreements 
in case of part performance thereof. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, as 
Personal Representative of the Estate 
of ENOCH SMITH, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
D.A. OSGUTHORPE, an 
individual, and D.A. OSGUTHORPE 
FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
Defendants. : 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 98-091-1302 
Judge Glen Iwasaki 
On September 12, 2000, this Court issued a Memorandum Decision. Based upon that 
Memorandum Decision, 
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff recover from Defendants 
$498,441.02, which includes prejudgment interest through September 20, 2000. It is further 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT Plaintiff recover from Defendants daily prejudgment 
interest in the amount of $88.53 per day from September 20, 2000 until the date this Judgment 
is entered, and that Plaintiff recover from Defendants postjudgment interest at the rate of 
8.052% until paid, plus court costs of $ 507.27. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, DECLARED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants are 
obligated to pay to Plaintiff Plaintiff's share of future lease payments as described in the 
Dissolution Agreement dated November 3, 1966 and that this Court shall retain continuing 
jurisdiction over this matter. 
DATED this 
li  tt r. 
£_ day Q^l/zO^ , 2001 
BY THE 
Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Third Judicial Court Judge 
APPENDIX 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1953) 
Estate or interest in real property. 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a 
term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or 
concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be 
created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than 
by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing 
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering 
or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized 
by writing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1953): 
Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one 
year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be 
void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is 
in writing subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to 
be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-5 (1953): 
Partnership property. 
All property originally brought into the partnership stock, or 
subsequently acquired by purchase or otherwise on account of the 
partnership, is partnership property. 
Unless the contrary intention appears, property acquired 
with partnership funds is partnership property. 
Any estate in real property may be acquired in the 
partnership name. Title so acquired can be conveyed only in the 
partnership name. 
A conveyance to a partnership in the partnership name, 
though without words of inheritance, passes the entire estate of the 
grantor, unless a contrary intent appears. 
APPENDIX 4 
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
UTRRCPRule12 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12 
WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS 
Copr. © West Group 2001. All rights reserved. 
Current with amendments received through 9-1-2001. 
RULE 12. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the 
court, a defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service 
of the summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty 
days after service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. 
A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer 
thereto within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply 
to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer 
or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the 
order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this 
rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed 
by order of the court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in 
a pleading does not affect the time for responding to the remaining claims: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the 
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days 
after notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the 
more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of 
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of 
process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A 
motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further 
pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with 
one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or 
by further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading 
sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to 
serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the trial any 
defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the 
defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to 
and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary 
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given 
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion 
by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but 
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on 
the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside 
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall 
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, 
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (1)-(7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard 
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court 
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably 
be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more 
definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall 
point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is 
granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice 
of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may 
strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it 
deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion 
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court 
may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, 
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may 
join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a 
party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses 
and objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, 
the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or 
objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not 
presented either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense 
of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of 
failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a 
legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is 
permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the 
merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties 
or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court 
shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall 
be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may 
have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading 
after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed 
a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an 
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant 
may file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and 
charges which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and 
determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court 
shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient 
sureties as security for payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded 
against such plaintiff. No security shall be required of any officer, 
instrumentality, or agency of the United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the 
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court 
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
[Amended effective November 1, 2000.] 
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RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at 
any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to 
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed 
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it 
is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or 
by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading 
within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 
days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, 
unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When issues not raised by the 
pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be 
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the 
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any 
time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result 
of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in 
the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set 
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment 
relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a 
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which 
have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. 
Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is defective in its 
statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it advisable 
that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so order, 
specifying the time therefor. 
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RULE 19. JOINDER OF PERSONS NEEDED FOR JUST ADJUDICATION 
(a) Persons to Be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of 
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his 
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) 
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated 
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter 
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the 
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, 
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed 
interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made 
a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made 
a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined 
party objects to venue and his joinder would render the venue of the action 
improper, he shall be dismissed from the action. 
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person as 
described in Subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court 
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed 
among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being 
thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court 
include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence 
might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to 
which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or 
other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a 
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether 
the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for non-
joinder. 
(c) Pleading Reasons for Non-joinder. A pleading asserting a claim for 
relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as 
described in Subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons 
why they are not joined. 
(d) Exception of Class Actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of 
Rule 23. 
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RULE 54. JUDGMENTS; COSTS 
(a) Definition; Form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital 
of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims and/or Involving Multiple Parties. When 
more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties 
are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or 
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such 
determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however 
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and 
liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to 
any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is 
subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all 
the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for Judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by 
default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in 
whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such 
relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several 
claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the 
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by Default. A judgment by default shall not be different in 
kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for 
judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To Whom Awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either 
in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of 
course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, 
however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the 
action, other than costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for 
review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the 
state of Utah, its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent 
permitted by law. 
(2) How Assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after 
the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are 
claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary 
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof 
duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and 
that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or 
proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days 
after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of 
costs taxed by the court in which the judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of 
or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as 
served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(3) and (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and Costs to Be Included in the Judgment. The clerk must 
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or 
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed 
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the 
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a 
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
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RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a 
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part 
thereof. 
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor 
as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory 
in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is 
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall 
be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required. Supporting 
and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively 
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn 
or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit 
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits 
to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or 
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported 
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of 
a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this 
rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court 
shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him 
to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
[Amended effective November 1, 1997.] 
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